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Political Finance in Central Eastern Europe:
An Interim Report
Der Beitrag analysiert Gesetze und Regelungen über die Finanzierung von politischen Parteien
und Wahlkampagnen in 17 Ländern: Albanien, Weißrussland, Bosnien-Herzegowina, Bulgarien,
Kroatien, Tschechien, Estland, Ungarn, Lettland, Litauen, Mazedonien, Moldawien, Polen, Rumänien,
Russland, Slowakei und Ukraine. Er bietet einen Überblick über die Kosten der Politik in einigen
dieser Länder und stellt Hypothesen auf zu Mustern der Politikfinanzierung in Mittelosteuropa. Ein
zentrales Ergebnis ist die Vielfalt der Politikfinanzierung in den untersuchten Ländern, was zumindest
teilweise auf die unterschiedlichen historischen, politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Merkmale
der Länder in der Region zurückzuführen ist. Nach der Häufigkeit der angewandten Regelungen und
Förderungen in den behandelten Ländern ergibt sich folgende Reihung: freie Sendungen in Radio
und/oder TV: 100%; direkte staatliche Unterstützung von Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen: 76%;
Ausgabenbeschränkungen (für Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen): 59%; Beschränkungen der Spenden
an Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen: 47%. Die geringe Bedeutung von Mitgliedsbeiträgen scheint
ein hervorstechendes Merkmal zu sein. In einigen der untersuchten Länder sind reiche Oligarchen
als politische Finanziers aufgetreten, und einige post-kommunistische Parteien sind nach wie vor
stark von Mieteinnahmen aus Gebäuden abhängig, die sie von den früheren kommunistischen Re-
gimes geerbt haben.
1. Introduction
The special issue of the Austrian Journal of
Political Science on the subject of political fi-
nance goes to press at a time of flux in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). A number of coun-
tries in the region recently have enacted new
laws on aspects of election and party funding;
other countries are in the midst of debates about
legal reforms. At the same time, the funding of
politics in the post-Communist countries is rap-
idly emerging as a field of academic research.
The pioneering chapter by Paul G. Lewis on
Party funding in post-communist east-central
Europe, which appeared as recently as 1998,
has largely been overtaken by subsequent re-
search. Some of this new work has been pub-
lished and much more of it is currently in the
form of conference papers, which are about to
be published.
Against such a background, this article is in-
evitably an interim report. It consists of three
main sections: the first gives a review of cur-
rent laws and regulations; the second traces
some of the realities of party or campaign fund-
ing; and the third interprets the legal and em-
pirical findings. The first section, which deals
with the legal framework, is the most complete.
The second concentrates on the actual patterns
of income and expenditure of political parties
and the cost of election campaigns. This sec-
tion gives findings that are based on a smaller
number of countries, since there are still gaps
in empirical research on a number of countries
in the region.
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Although the issue of where Eastern Europe
begins and ends and the related question of what
the geographical area should be called have been
discussed many times before, it is relevant and
necessary to deal with these questions in a few
introductory paragraphs. Names of territories 
regions as well as countries  are loaded with
emotional meanings; they express underlying
assumptions and legal claims. It is vital, there-
fore, to address the question of nomenclature.
Moreover, it is not possible to make sensible
hypotheses about patterns of political finance
in the countries under review unless their his-
torical, political, social and economic back-
grounds are assessed.
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe
are linked by their geographical proximity and
by the fact that they have all emerged recently
from Communist rule. For these two reasons, it
is understandable that they are generally treated
as a group for research and for practical
purposes. Indeed, they may be regarded as a
post-colonial group on a par with the (mainly
African) former possessions of France, which
belong to La Francophonie, or the former
British dominions and colonies, which now
belong to the Commonwealth. History has
strong effects for a considerable time on the le-
gal and political structures of post-colonial ter-
ritories.
Table 1: People in Central Eastern Europe
Population GNP 2000 Main Religion Main Language Minorities
2000 (per capita, in (Percentage
(in thousands) US-Dollars at  of
Purchasing population)
Price Parity)
Albania 3,510 2,804 Muslim (70%) Tosk 5%
Belarus 10,350 6,319 Orthodox (80%) Byelorussian 19%
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 3,922 1,720(1) Muslim (40%) Croatian 56%
Bulgaria 7,707 4,809 Orthodox (83%) Bulgarian 17%
Croatia 4,334 6,749 Catholic (76%) Croatian 22%
Czech Republic 10,264 12,362 Atheist (40%) Czech 19%
Estonia 1,423 7,682 Lutheran Estonian 35%
Hungary 10,106 10,232 Catholic (67%) Hungarian 10%
Latvia 2,385 5,728 Lutheran Lettish 43%
Lithuania 3,611 6,436 Catholic Lithuanian 19%
Macedonia 2,046 4,254 Orthodox Macedonian 33%
Moldova 4,432 1,947 Orthodox (98%) (Romanian)(2) 35%
Poland 38,634 7,619 Catholic (95%) Polish 2%
Romania 22,364 5,848 Orthodox (70%) Romanian 10%
Russia 145,470 6,460 Orthodox Russian 18%
Slovakia 5,415 9,699 Catholic (60%) Slovakian 14%
Slovenia 1,930 14,293 Catholic (69%) Slovenian 12%
Ukraine 48,760 3,194 Orthodox Ukrainian 27%
Yugoslavia 10,677 2,300 Orthodox (65%) Serbian 37%
NOTES:
(1) Bosnia and Herzegovina: GNP is for 19992000.
(2) Moldovas main language Moldovan is virtually identical to Romanian.
SOURCES: CIA World Factbook [http://www.cia.gov/publications/]; Adrian Karatnycky, general editor (2001).
Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 20002001. New York: Freedom
House, Transparency International [http://www.transparency.org/]; World Bank (2000).
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Yet, neither the common experience of So-
viet hegemony nor geography are sufficient to
ensure uniformity within the post-Communist
countries. The boundaries of the region and its
naming are uncertain: the term Mitteleuropa 
with its connotations of a zone of German and
Austrian influence  sends shivers down Brit-
ish and French spines. Central Europe and
Eastern Europe are more neutral, descriptive
words but they do not define where Central
Europe ends and Eastern Europe begins. There
is the further question of determining where
Eastern Europe ends and the Asian parts of
the former Soviet Union begin. For the purposes
of this article, Russia and Ukraine are the most
easterly countries which are included.
In broad terms, there is a distinction between
countries in Central Europe  those relatively
close to Western Europe  and the rest. This is
seen in particular in the main measure of pros-
perity (Gross National Product per capita) and
in the measure of democratic credentials pro-
Table 2: Politics in Central Eastern Europe
President Electoral Freedom Freedom Corruption State Illegal
directly system House House perception capture political
elected index rating index(1) index(2) finance
200001 200001 (rank (in index(3)
order) percent) (in
percent)
Albania no Mixed 9 partly free n.a. 16 25
Belarus YES Majoritarian 12 not free n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bosnia-
  Herzegovina YES Proportional 9 partly free n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria YES Proportional 5 free 47= 28 42
Croatia YES Proportional 5 free 47= 27 30
Czech
  Republic no Proportional 3 free 47= 11 6
Estonia no Proportional 3 free 28 10 17
Hungary no Proportional 3 free 31= 7 5
Latvia no Proportional 3 free 59= 30 35
Lithuania YES Mixed 3 free 38= 11 13
Macedonia YES Majoritarian 7 partly free n.a. n.a. n.a.
Moldova no Majoritarian 6 partly free 63= 37 42
Poland YES Proportional 3 free 44= 12 10
Romania YES Proportional 4 free 69= 21 27
Russia YES Mixed 10 partly free 79= 32 24
Slovakia YES Proportional 3 free 51= 24 20
Slovenia YES Proportional 3 free 34 7 11
Ukraine YES Mixed 8 partly free 83 32 29
Yugoslavia YES Mixed 8 partly free n.a. n.a. n.a.
NOTES:
(1) The Corruption Perception Index is produced by Transparency International. Only selected countries are in-
cluded. The table shows the rank ordering of specific countries among those covered by TI. The sign  =  denotes
that the ranking of a country is equal to that of another country.
(2) The State Capture Index is produced by the World Bank institute: the higher the percentage, the more serious
the incidence of state capture.
(3) Illegal political finance is one of six dimensions of state capture. It measures the percentage of firms which
considered themselves directly affected by illegal political donations.
SOURCES: see table 1.
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vided by the Freedom House index. However,
it is the variety of the countries in the region
that is the most striking feature. This provides a
warning against the presumption that political
financing is subject to similar influences
throughout the region.
The absence of any obvious regional identity
is seen in the lack of a common history of exist-
ence as sovereign states, as well as in the diver-
sity of languages and of predominant religions.
Of the nineteen countries listed, only five retain
the territories they held during the Cold War.
No fewer than eleven of them are newly-cre-
ated states or states which regained a sovereignty
of earlier times. Three countries  Russia, Yu-
goslavia and the Czech Republic  are the trun-
cated remains of states that were stripped of
much of their territory in the 1990s. The differ-
ent countries have contrasting political legacies
from the Second World War, varying between
former puppet states of Nazi Germany (such as
Slovakia and Croatia) and countries prominent
in their resistance to Hitler.
The uniformity of the population of countries
such as Poland and Albania contrasts with the
strength of ethnic minorities in a considerable
number of the states in the region. Ethnic fac-
tors may affect politics in general and political
financing in particular in some of the countries
under review. Moreover, the countries range in
population from under two million (in the case
of Estonia and Slovenia) to 145 million in Rus-
sia. GNP per capita ranges from under USD
2,000 per annum in Bosnia and in Moldova to
over USD 14,000 per annum in Slovenia. The
political systems are rather more uniform though
there is no shortage of exceptions to the general
pattern, which is one of directly elected presi-
dents and (especially in the countries abutting
on Western Europe) of proportional electoral
systems. In view of this diversity, it should come
as no surprise that the picture of political financ-
ing that will emerge is also one of considerable
variation.
Several kinds of source have been used: (1)
legislation regulating party and campaign fi-
nance in the respective countries; (2) informa-
tion provided by representatives of Central Elec-
tion Commissions; (3) interviews with in-coun-
try experts on party finance1; (4) reports pre-
pared by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe; (5) reports in the media.
Information is for laws in force as of October 1,
2001.
2. Laws and regulations
Before proceeding to examine the actual pat-
terns of political incomes and expenditures, it
is necessary to review the laws and rules about
party and campaign finance which have emerged
in the region since the fall of Communism. This
section includes information on Albania,
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. It at-
tempts to lay out the most common patterns of
campaign finance regulations and to identify a
number of common shortcomings of campaing
funding in the existing regimes. Information has
not been gathered from Yugoslavia and Slo-
venia.
The main kinds of regulations and subsidies
in the countries under review are shown in Table
3.
Ranked by the frequency with which they
occur in the countries covered by the article, the
main kinds of regulations and subsidies are: free
radio and/or television broadcasting: 100%; sub-
sidies-in-kind: 94%; public disclosure of party
accounts: 88%; complete or partial ban on for-
eign donations: 82%; direct public funding of
parties and/or candidates: 76%; spending limits
(on parties and/or candidates): 59%; limits on
contributions to parties and/or candidates: 47%;
tax reliefs on political donations: 24%; bans on
paid political advertising: 18%.
After the collapse of communist regimes,
Central and East European countries moved
quickly to adopt institutional frameworks char-
acteristic of advanced democracies. That in-
cluded the area of campaign finance where no
prior regulations existed for obvious reasons.
However, experience with competitive politics
prompted most countries to revise and further
detail their regulatory frameworks of campaign
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finance. Therefore, it is appropriate to speak of
party and campaign finance regimes in the mak-
ing. Indeed, a feature of political finance laws
in the region is the frequency with which they
have been altered and continue to be changed.
The countries under review have so far de-
veloped a variety of regulatory regimes of cam-
paign finance. Some (such as Croatia) have cho-
sen notably liberal regulation and (as in Latvia)
little state interference with campaign funding,
while others prefer much more detailed regula-
tions (Poland) or severe restrictions on the role
of non-state donors (Belarus). Poland has re-
cently chosen to prohibit corporate donations
to parties in an attempt to limit the political in-
fluence of large corporations. Belarus restricts
the entrepreneurial activities of political parties
and virtually bans private donations.
(a) Regulations and bans
Foreign donations. As far as restrictions are
concerned, one of the most common is a ban,
either partial or complete, on contributions from
foreign sources (foreign citizens, foreign gov-
ernments, international companies and organi-
zations). This is seen as a warrant of national
sovereignty not to be undermined by external
forces. Foreign donations are allowed in a few
special cases. The role of the international com-
munity in the post-war restructuring of Bosnia-
Herzegovina perhaps explains why certain for-
eign contributions are permitted. Lithuania has
chosen to involve the Lithuanian diaspora in
funding party activities, thereby giving certain
advantage to right-wing, nationalist parties that
ruled the country during the adoption of relevant
legislation.
Anonymous donations. Most post-communist
countries have opted to prohibit anonymous
donations. However, Poland, Bulgaria, and
Lithuania have taken the view that reasonable
amounts of anonymous donations cannot under-
mine the democratic process. The Polish legis-
lation stipulates that anonymous donations are
to be deposited in bank accounts separate from
the rest of campaign funding. Bulgarian laws
stipulate that anonymous donations must not
exceed 25% of the total party income. In
Lithuania, a single anonymous donation cannot
exceed USD 25, but the total of these donations
is not limited.
Contribution limits. About half of the regions
countries have introduced limits on contribu-
tions to parties and/or individual candidates in
the elections. While they were designed to re-
strict the political influence of large businesses,
preliminary findings indicate that money tends
to find its way to political party accounts via
mediations and donations by third parties, or via
direct payments to third parties for services ren-
dered.
Spending limits. Nearly two-thirds of post-
communist countries have opted for overall
spending limits during campaigns. However, a
number of experts from particular countries have
pointed out to the authors that these restrictions
are often circumvented  either due to loopholes
in the legislation or by means of illegal actions,
which are particularly suited for cash-based
economies of post-communist countries. It must
be added that an inflexible limit policy may force
parties to engage in illegal activities if  as is
the case in Russia  the law sets unrealistically
low contribution or spending limits.
Bans on paid television advertisements. A few
countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia) have opted for a ban on paid po-
litical advertising in an attempt to weaken the
very need for large financial resources. The pro-
posal is being discussed in Latvia as part of a
wider reform plan of party finance but no deci-
sion has been reached yet. Opponents of the
advertising ban cite the danger of growing hid-
den paid advertising, which constitutes an of-
fence.
(b) Public subsidies
Public funding. While most countries in the
region provide direct state financial subsidies
to parties and/or candidates, this is by no means
a universal approach. Countries such as Latvia,
Moldova, and Ukraine refrain from giving di-
rect state support to political contenders. One
possible explanation for this approach is a lack
of state resources at the time of adoption of the
relevant legislation, which led to a lesser in-
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volvement of the state. Secondly, absence of
state subsidies may be related to an existence of
one or two major parties that have access to rich
corporate funding and try to frame political com-
petition in a particular way. Moreover, as shown
in the next section, in some of the countries with
direct public funding (for example, Russia) the
amounts given are very small.
Income tax relief. Hungary and Estonia pro-
vide this form of indirect public funding. In
Estonia, tax relief is limited to donations by in-
dividuals up to 5% of their taxable incomes af-
ter deductions; for corporations, tax relief is
given for political donations up to 3% of their
monthly wage expenditure.
Benefits in-kind. All countries covered by this
study offer free air-time on public radio and tele-
vision.
(c) Controls
A number of Central and East European coun-
tries have introduced special election accounts,
from which a campaign of a party or candidate
can be financed. While it is difficult to speak of
a clear-cut trend, countries using proportional
representation to elect their parliaments tend to
refrain from the system of special accounts.
Belarus has chosen a very unusual arrange-
ment, which, however, is perfectly in line with
the overall state-oriented tradition in the realm
of political finance in this country. According
to the Belarussian legislation, a single, state-run
election account is opened before every elec-
tion. Donations can be transferred to this ac-
count only, and the income is distributed equally
among all candidates. Clearly, this system has
effectively discouraged any donations, drained
contenders from legal financial means and made
indirect, hidden funding of election campaigns
a widespread practice.
(d) Disclosure and enforcement
Disclosure rules are the norm and exist more
frequently in CEE countries (and in the former
Soviet Union in general) than in most other parts
of the world. The only two countries where
political parties need not reveal their income and
expenditure accounts are Albania and Belarus.
Both countries score low on the Freedom House
index of political freedom. In three more coun-
tries (Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia), politi-
cal parties must disclose their overall accounts
but need not identify individual donors. In the
twelve other countries covered by this article,
both accounts and lists of donors must be re-
vealed. Moreover, Lithuania has gone to the
length of making financial records of parties and
individual candidates available to a wider pub-
lic on its internet website.
The problem about disclosure does not lie in
the laws themselves but in the lack of enforce-
ment. While local media have shed light on an
abundant number of suspicious cases of politi-
cal finance, official inquiries or even investiga-
tions are rarely pursued. This can be attributed
to a lack of independent enforcement agencies
and insufficient involvement of civil society.
Moreover, penal codes of several countries sim-
ply lack sanctions for violations of party finance
rules, or sanctions are rather symbolic. In
Macedonia alone, election results of a political
party that had violated political finance regula-
tions can be declared null and void.
3. Patterns of income and expenditure
Those researching into political financing in
CEE are relatively fortunate in being able to
examine party accounts which are published in
a higher proportion of countries in the region
than is the case in most others. Nevertheless,
for reasons amplified below, the official figures,
especially concerning campaign expenditures,
need to be treated with great caution. They ap-
pear severely to underestimate the real levels of
spending.
However, even if allowances are made for the
unreliable nature of the evidence, the tentative
conclusion that emerges from existing academic
research is that in Central Eastern Europe, and
particularly in post-Soviet countries, the lack of
diverse sources of money emerges as the major
problem, and not the level of expenditure. More-
over, even if the real levels of income and ex-
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penditure, as distinct from the declared levels,
are still uncertain, two things are clear: the rela-
tive importance of different sources of political
finance, and the contrast between the funding
of communist (or post-communist) parties and
other parties.
Political funding in the region is characterised
by: (1) irregular flows of funds and relatively
non-diversified financial sources; (2) limited
income from membership subscriptions; (3) the
disproportionately large role of plutocratic fund-
ing, which often exceeds direct state subsidies.
For most of the CEE countries, state support is
of lesser importance than would be expected.
Another important aspect of political financ-
ing in CEE countries is the way in which politi-
cal parties have emerged from the Old Regime
unequally endowed. The extent of the Commu-
nist Parties hold on some of its economic re-
sources has a continuing influence in a number
of countries. The special circumstances of tran-
sition in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, for instance, undoubtedly had the effect of
protecting Communist Party finance. This was
especially the case in Poland.
(a) Membership fees and party taxes
The circumstances of transition from a non-
democratic regime to a democratic system do
not entirely account for the failure to develop a
popular financing of politics in CEE countries.
There have been similar failures in Western
countries. But low membership and  resulting
from this  low income from such membership
is especially pronounced in the CEE. If party
membership is measured as a percentage of the
electorate, there is a wide range of results both
within Western Europe and in the CEE. On av-
erage, the CEE scores considerably lower than
Western Europe. According to recent research
by Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen (2001, 9),
the percentage of electors who were party mem-
bers in 19992000 was 2.8% in the four CEE
countries for which evidence was available
(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Po-
land) compared with 5.5% in 16 countries of
Western Europe. Had figures been obtained from
more CEE countries, the proportion of party
members to electors would almost certainly have
been lower than 2.8% since the countries from
which statistics were not obtained generally
seem to have weaker party organisations.
Income from membership subscriptions is
particularly low in non-Communist parties. In
Bulgaria in 1995, the Union of Democratic
Forces (UDF) reported that party members paid
6.87% of its total income; in 1997, membership
subscriptions amounted to only 0.078% of the
total (Smilov 1999b). Records of the main
Czechoslovakian parties in 1991 showed a simi-
larly large differentiation between sources of
income in Communist and non-Communist par-
ties. While subscriptions to the Communist Party
of Bohemia and Moravia accounted for 36.6%
(approximately USD 1.32 million) of the total
party income (approximately USD 3.61 million),
for the Civic Movement, the Czechoslovak
Peoples Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Party, membership subscriptions accounted re-
spectively for 0.34%, 15.6% and 5% of the to-
tal income (Lewis 1998, 139).
In Estonia, in 2000, membership subscriptions
amounted to 1.81% of Pro Patrias income,
7.15% of the total Centre Partys income and
3.05% in the case of the Reform Party. The
Moderates stated in their annual financial re-
port that the party had not received any mem-
bership subscriptions at all (Pentus 2001). Even
in Hungary, the proportion of membership sub-
scriptions in party budgets is generally very low.
In 1995 the Hungarian Democratic Forum re-
ceived the equivalent of USD 79,500, which
accounted for 0.96% of the total income. In the
case of the Fidesz, the percentage of total in-
come accounted for by membership subscrip-
tions (approximately USD 5,738) was only
0.12% in 1995. Again, the post-communist
Hungarian Socialist Party received far more
from membership subscriptions, than any other
party, yet its income from this source was low:
3.27% of the total (approximately USD
160,000) (Lewis 1998, 139).
According to Steven Roper (2001), in the
case of Romania, party member dues have tra-
ditionally never been collected. Because of the
low standard of living and lack of participatory
culture, membership dues have never been an
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important source of party revenue. Similarly,
for the Ukrainian political parties the role of
membership subscriptions is very limited and
parties do not encourage their members to make
direct payment to the organisation. Yet, the So-
cialist Party manages to receive money indi-
rectly from its members and supporters who
subscribe to the partys newspapers.2  In Poland,
the low percentage of the electors who are party
members is especially striking when compared
with the years of Solidarity in the 1980s. Po-
land had a mass political movement, but when
the euphoria of 19891990 disappeared, the
political parties which came to take the place of
Solidarity had a smaller membership base than
those in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia.
If they are unable to raise the funds they con-
sider sufficient from voluntary payments from
ordinary party members, governing parties and
their candidates in many parts of the world levy
taxes upon those who derive benefits from
government. In post-communist regimes, two
classes of donor are the main sources of such
enforced contributions: (1) government contrac-
tors and (2) officeholders, both public and
elected.
In Estonia, the Moderates demand from all
their members in the legislature and from their
ministers a fixed quota equivalent to USD 29
per month (Pentus 2001). These party taxes
are recorded by Moderates as private donations.
The MPs of the Estonian Centrist Party are
obliged to pay every month a fixed share of their
salaries. In Romania, all parliamentary factions
oblige their MPs to make similar payments.
Roper (2001) reports that the amount may be
as much as 20% of an MPs monthly salary.
The Polish case shows the spectacular impor-
tance that these party taxes have come to as-
sume. The successful rise of this new form of
fundraising is the result of recent party
reorganisation and expansion.3  Parties demand
from members who hold an elective or ap-
pointed public office a fixed share of their sala-
ries. These tolls apply to most of the 560 mem-
bers of the legislature, hundreds of party mem-
bers with governmental positions, members of
supervisory boards and, above all, to thousands
of local councillors. The amount depends on the
party and in the case of councillors differs from
510% of their salaries or certain fixed quotas.
Members of supervisory boards and other mem-
bers with functional positions are compelled to
contribute 10% of their salaries.
(b) Donations from wealthy individuals,
corporations and candidates
The importance of large donations is in in-
verse proportion to the insignificance of money
from membership subscriptions. In Poland, in
terms of corporate support, institutional dona-
tions represented less than 40% in the 1991 cam-
paign, compared to about 87% of the total party
income of the Freedom Union in 1997. More-
over, in the 1995 Presidential Elections, Lech
Walesa received one major gift from business-
man Aleksander Guzowaty; this constituted al-
most 72% of Walesas income and, to date, is
the largest official donation in Polish politics.
In Latvia, an examination of the Latvian par-
ties annual reports shows that some 80% of their
funding comes from donations. According to
Ikstens (2001) large donations (more than USD
5,000) make up 80% of corporate contribution
and donations of more than USD 1,000 cover
almost 75% of income from private donations.
Most of the corporate donations arrive from fi-
nancial institutions, companies engaged in trans-
portation of oil and chemical products and from
the food industry as third most important con-
tributor. During the 1999 campaign in Estonia,
all parties except the Centre Party, received more
money from the private companies than from
individuals. According to the parties official
reports Pro Patria received 74.55% of its total
income from corporate donors, while the Cen-
tre Party received 26.99% of its total income
from private companies. In the case of the Mod-
erates, corporate donations amounted to 39.1%
of the total income and for the Reform Party
this figure was 47.66%.4
In Russia, in the 1995 Duma Elections, 515
corporate donors contributed approximately
USD 6 million to the 30 electoral associations
(almost 38% of their income). During the elec-
tions, institutional donations represented about
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55% of the total income of Our Home Russia
(about USD 1.3 million) and 49% in the case of
LDPR (approximately USD 1.1 million). Dur-
ing the 1996 Presidential Elections contributions
from corporate donors played the most impor-
tant role, representing more than 72% of the
candidates total income (USD 10.6 million).
General Lebed received 93% of his income from
the 94 legal entities (USD 2.65 million), while
donations constituted 90% of Yeltsins campaign
fund (about USD 2.6 million). These publicly
declared statistics are almost certainly underes-
timates.
In Bulgaria, despite the absence of legally
disclosed information concerning parties in-
come, the clear picture is that in recent years
donations and sponsorship have played a major
role in financing political parties. In 1995, do-
nations accounted for 47.81% of the total Bul-
garian Socialist Party income, compared with
the Union of the Democratic Forces which re-
ceived 82.25% of its income from donations;
by 1997 donations constituted 99.9% of UDFs
total income.
In the Ukraine, more than in any other coun-
try, informal political actors  financial groups
and political oligarchs  dominate the politi-
cal spectrum. Even though Table 4 presents of-
ficially declared campaign spending which
might be irrelevant, as parties often lower the
real cost of the campaign, the very strong pres-
ence of business involvement is evident. Oli-
garchs took a direct and active role in support-
ing political parties and campaign blocks. In the
1998 Parliamentary Elections money officially
received from legal entities accounted for 91.4%
of the committees overall income.
(c) Public funding
For the new democracies of the CEE direct
public funding is an almost standard feature;
however, the precise pattern of state subvention
varies considerably and the levels of direct pub-
lic funding in all the CEE countries differ sig-
nificantly.
In several countries, the level of public sub-
sidy is notably low. In Bulgaria, the state finan-
cial support was most significant in the first
years of the transition period: it was gradually
scaled down, and in the last general election
became largely symbolical. This is partly ex-
plained by the financial collapse of the state at
that time (spring 1997) (Smilov 1999b). In the
Russian State Duma elections of 1995, the total
amount of direct public subsidies distributed
among electoral blocs was little more than USD
1 million, which constituted about 6% of their
total income (approximately USD 16 million).
Thus, 43 registered electoral associations re-
Table 4: Official Financial Reports of Major Political Parties and Blocks
in Ukrainian 1998 Parliamentary Elections
Name of party or block Total budget Received from Percent of all
corporations income
Hromada 190,132.00 N/A N/A
The Green Party 1,128,487.50 1,127,487.50 99.9%
Communist Party 24,934.60 2,491.10 9.9%
Labour & Liberal Block 705935.00 705935.00 100%
United Social Democrats 529,900.00 529,900.00 100%
Party of Regional Renaissance 793,568.90 754,802.90 95%
Agrarian Party 125,000.00 101,000.00 80.8%
Peoples Democratic Party 1,915,936.30 1,915,936.00 100%
All-Ukrainian Workers Party 56,558.10 56,338.10 99.9%
National Front 7,401.00 N/A N/A
Socialist & Peasant Block 106,967.00 20,000.00 18.7%
The Working Ukraine Block 406,600.00 386,600.00 95%
SOURCE: Central Election Commission, in: Holos Ukrainy, #57 (1807), 26 March 1998.
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ceived only some USD 23,255 each.5  During
the 1996 presidential elections, each of the 11
registered candidates received approximately
USD 60,000 of direct subsidies, which ac-
counted for only 4.46% of their declared in-
comes.6  In the Duma elections of 1999, direct
state subsidies to all political parties rose to USD
4.6 million. Every candidate received direct state
subsidies amounting to the hardly grand total
of USD 38.91; this accounted for 0.06% of their
total spending allowance. During the 2000 presi-
dential elections, money was allocated to all
registered presidential candidates. Each of the
11 candidates running for president received an
insignificant sum from the federal budget.7
In Poland, the first step towards state subsidy
of political financing was made with the Elec-
toral Law of 1993, which introduced state re-
imbursement of electioneering expenses. Thus,
the committee received approximately the
equivalent of USD 7,650 for each deputy elected
to the two chambers. After the 1997 General
Election, the treasury allocated to the particular
election committees the total of USD 4.1 mil-
lion. The two main parties, the Solidarity Elec-
tion Action (AWS) and the Democratic Left
Alliance (SLD), received about 79.3% of this,
amounting to USD 7,350 for each elected
deputy. Thus, the AWS, with its 201 MPs and
51 Senators, received USD 1.85 million and the
SLD with 164 MPs and 28 Senators received
about USD 1.4 million. All the other four par-
ties had to divide proportionately the sum of
USD 0.8 million. Public subsidies accounted for
only 4.75% of the total declared income of the
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) in 1997, and 4.44%
in 1998. In 1998 public financing accounted for
11.63% of the Freedom Unions (UW) total in-
come. The Labour Union, not represented in the
current parliament, recorded public funding as
the main source of income.8 As a result of the
recent political finance reforms of 2001, public
financing in Poland was increased. It is esti-
mated that these new subsidies might cost the
state budget around USD 14.5 million in 2002.
The role of state refunds for campaign expen-
diture is clearly evident in the Czech Republic.
After the 1996 general elections the successful
ODS of Vaclav Klaus received about USD 6
million from the state budget. In the parliamen-
tary elections of 1998, a substantial subsidy
amounting to USD 5.5 million went to the victo-
rious Social Democrats.
Estonian political parties rely heavily on state
financial assistance to fund their routine activi-
ties. In 2000 public funding accounted for
67.95% of Pro Patrias regular income 87.75%
of that of the Centre Party. For the Moderates,
the figure was 92.83%, and for the Reform Party
82.51%. However, election campaigns are less
dependent on state subsidies. During the 1999
election campaign, public funding accounted for
only 7.47% of the total Pro Patria campaign in-
come, 12.90% for the Centre Party, 23.07% for
the Moderates and 15.07% for the Reform Party.
The state funding of political parties is an
important factor in the operation of Hungarian
democracy. As early as 1990, state funding ac-
counted for 93% of the Independent Small-
holders Party budget, 88% of the Christian
Democratic Peoples Party budget and 24% in
the case of the Hungarian Socialist Party. Well-
documented records for 1995 confirm signifi-
cant state dependence in the cases of six parlia-
mentary parties. Parties received from 18%
(Fidesz) to 90% (Alliance of Free Democrats)
of their total income in the form of state subsi-
dies.
Indirect state subsidies have contributed sig-
nificantly to party financing in the CEE coun-
tries. There are many various kinds of indirect
subsidies but two are of particular importance:
free broadcasting and subsidies for parliamen-
tary groups. An important source of money for
CEE parties consists in specific grants paid to
parliamentary caucuses and individual parlia-
mentarians (excluding salaries) (Lewis 1998,
145ff.). The demarcation of different kinds of
public funding is a controversial matter; how-
ever, these funds should be classified as a source
of indirect subsidies for political parties from
the states budget. Generally, grants for party
representation in Parliament are a perfect
supplement to the partys central and local of-
fices and can also be used for campaign activi-
ties.9  Undoubtedly, most of the CEE political
parties would not be able to operate efficiently
without access to these parliamentary re-
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sources.10  For countries with low direct subsi-
dies to political parties these indirect subsidies
play an important role for non-parliamentary
activities.
(d) The cost of politics
An examination of the revenue and expendi-
ture items from the parties published annual
reports shows that there was a significant in-
crease in election expenditure between 1991 and
2000. In particular, expenditure on the mass
media burgeoned. Yet, official statistics need to
be treated with considerable scepticism. In some
CEE countries, the artificially low level of the
legal limits on permitted campaign spending
makes the reporting of political party expendi-
ture irrelevant.
The way in which the reported statistics have
reflected changes in spending limits is demon-
strated by the financial accounts of Russian par-
ties and electoral blocs. During the 1993 elec-
tion campaign, national blocs spent USD 3.7
million; two years later national blocs reported
spending USD 15 million on campaigning. In
1995, spending limits were imposed allowing
individual candidates to spend no more than
approximately USD 100,000 and electoral blocs
no more than USD 2.4 million. The officially
reported figures on campaign spending naturally
slumped in line with the new regulations. In the
1999 elections to the Russian Duma, individual
candidates were allowed to spend only USD
65,000 and electoral blocs USD 1.6 million. Not
surprisingly the press has reported that, unoffi-
cially, national blocs spend considerably more
than these totals, which of course they were
unable to declare without laying themselves
open to prosecution for exceeding the legal lim-
its. In fact, according to the campaign fundraiser
for the SPS (Union of Right Forces), the party
spent over USD 25,000 million on the Duma
elections.11  Dr Leonid Gozman, who was re-
sponsible for the partys electioneering strategy,
reportedly spent no less than USD 200,000 on
campaign research alone.12
In the Russian 2000 presidential elections,
each candidate could spend a mere USD
920,000 in the first round of elections, and aTa
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further USD 0.3 million in the second round. In
the case of Putins campaign, the total declared
sum of contributions to his electoral fund was
about USD 1,030,000, part of which was re-
turned to the contributors. Putin had intimated
that he had no intention of running an intensive
and costly election campaign. During the presi-
dential campaign of 2000 four of the candidates
made serious accusations against Grigorij
Yavlinskij to the effect that his extensive news-
paper and television coverage exceeded the ar-
tificially low limit for the first round of USD
0.9 million.
In general, Russian, Polish and Ukrainian
examples show that spending limits have proven
in practice to be a fiction having been introduced
at an unrealistically low level. Limits not only
have failed to curb a political finance arms
race, but their failure also has undermined con-
fidence in the whole system of political finance
regulations. The rules have made it hard to as-
sess the true levels of expenditure.
4. Trends, hypotheses and tentative
evaluations
More than a decade ago Eastern Europe
started its transition to democracy with the adop-
tion of constitutions, which introduced the rights
to vote freely and to form political parties. The
pluralistic and competitive political process was
not the only value enshrined in the transition
constitutions, for instance, various social rights
 the rights to work, to healthcare assistance,
maternity and retirement benefits, and to free
education  found their place in many of the
East European basic laws. Typically, the fram-
ers across the region were not occupied with
the question of the cost of the rights they were
entrenching. One of the consequences of their
negligence was that many of the constitutional
social commitments remained meaningless dec-
larations. In terms of party funding and cam-
paign finance, the constitutions were virtually
silent, and left the regulation of this issue to the
national legislatures.
Now, a decade later, the time is ripe for a re-
examination of the ways in which the right to
vote and to political representation in Eastern
Europe have been institutionalised. Who are the
actual beneficiaries of the competitive elections
which have been established in the region? Is
the political process open to a plurality of inter-
ests? Are there systematically excluded minori-
ties?
Few of these questions can be answered mean-
ingfully without a careful study of the practices
of party funding and campaign finance which
have been developed in Eastern Europe. With-
out such an examination, one cannot be sure that
the rights to vote and to political participation
have a different fate than the fate of the quickly
forgotten constitutional social commitments.
From this perspective, the first troubling ten-
dency in the region is that little attention is be-
ing paid to the issue of party funding and cam-
paign finance as a constitutional matter affect-
ing the very fundamentals of the democratic
order. A clear demonstration of this is the fact
that the CEEs constitutional courts, although
being very active in other areas, have, with a
very few exceptions,13  avoided the political
questions of party and campaign finance. Leg-
islatures have enjoyed broad policy discretion
in the adoption of rules on political finance, with
no serious input or oversight either by civil so-
ciety or a judicial body. Not surprisingly, this
situation has led to the production of legislation
which contains many provisions:
(a) aiming mainly to express a certain ideology;
(b) attempting to establish the dominance of the
pro-governmental parties, and oppress the
opposition;
(c) creating loopholes and lack of transparency
as far as this maximises the advantages of the
major parties or political actors.
The ideology expressed by the predominant
majority of the party and campaign finance laws
in the region contains a bias towards egalitari-
anism and regulation. Thus, the review of such
laws in the second section of this article has
found that all of the countries covered provide
free air-time during campaigns, and most have
schemes of public funding and require some
public disclosure of political funds. Contribu-
tion limits and spending limits are common,
though by no means universal (see also Ikstens
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et al. 2001). All these measures and techniques
are traditionally employed to equalise the
chances of different contestants in the political
process in financial terms, and to reduce the
impact of personal and corporate wealth on poli-
tics. A forthcoming study (Pinto-Duschinsky et
al. 2002) has demonstrated that, in comparative
terms, the Eastern and Central European coun-
tries have introduced more regulation in the area
of public disclosure than Western Europe and
the Americas.
Finally, the American style libertarian argu-
ment of money is speech has been entirely
absent from the Eastern European political
scene; radical libertarian principles of legitima-
tion have not been used in the area of party fund-
ing and campaign finance, despite the promi-
nence of neo-liberalism in parts of the region.
The demonstrable ideological bias in favour
of egalitarianism and regulation probably has a
historical explanation: the combined effect of
the communist legacy and the influence of po-
litical and legal ideas from Germany, Austria,
and France. Yet, if one looks beneath the com-
mon ideological surface of the developing mod-
els, one would find different patterns of fund-
ing of politics.
As shown in the previous section, Eastern
European countries have failed to develop a di-
versified system of funding sources. In most
CEE countries, money for politics comes prin-
cipally from corporations or large individual
contributors. Small donations are as a rule not
encouraged in the CEE by forms of matching
grants (which make state subsidies dependent
upon parallel, private fundraising), or by tar-
geted tax relief/credit on small political dona-
tions. Despite the low levels of income from
membership subscriptions, there are no legisla-
tive efforts to encourage the parties to extend
their membership base  state subsidies are as a
rule tied only to electoral performance and par-
liamentary representation.
Against this background, public funding of
parties and candidates (either in the form of re-
imbursement of electoral expenditures, or in
annual subventions) has been the only effort to
diversify the sources of political money, and
decrease the plutocratic influence in politics.
Thus, generally, two major types of models have
emerged in the region: one with significant pub-
lic funding, and one with predominantly private
funding coming mainly from corporate sources,
or wealthy individual donors. It should be noted,
however, that both of these models exhibit sus-
tained legislative efforts to equalise the chances
of political contestants in financial terms: the
countries without public funding, as a rule, fea-
ture various contribution and expenditure re-
strictions, free air-time on electronic media, and
some forms of in-kind support for the parties.
Formally, only Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine
do not envisage forms of public funding. Yet,
countries such as Bulgaria and Russia provide
only nominal financial support for parties and
candidates, covering a tiny fraction of their ex-
penditure. In other countries, such as Albania,
public funding has been introduced very re-
cently, and any conclusions about the actual
characteristics of the model will be premature.
And there is the case of Belarus, where public
funding of candidates in elections is fully within
the discretion of the president of the country.
Whether public funding in this case is an ele-
ment of democratic government or an instru-
ment to suppress and control the opposition is
an open question.
Is there a correlation between the establish-
ment of a particular party funding model and
other features of the political regimes in the CEE
countries? All of the central case countries
without public funding  Bulgaria, Latvia,
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine  happen to be coun-
tries with a high state capture index according
to the 2000 study of the World Bank14  (World
Bank 2000). Especially telling seems the aver-
age share of the respondent firms in these five
countries directly affected by illegal donations
to political parties  34.4%  when the average
for all transition countries is 20%. Similarly on
average, countries without public funding have
a much higher index of buying of legislative
votes.15
These data suggest that the lack of public
funding is correlated with the opportunity for
corporations and wealthy individuals to cap-
ture the policy-making capacity of the transi-
tion states. This problem has recently been over-
02_01_2_ikstens.p65 22.12.2007, 17:3634
35
exposed as a problem of corruption. Funda-
mentally, however, it is a problem of the au-
tonomy of the democratic institutions, and a
defect of democratic representation. Put some-
what differently, this is a process of degrada-
tion of democracy and its transformation into
oligarchic forms of government. It is by no
means coincidental that the political landscape
of Russia and Ukraine is inhabited by clans,
oligarchs, and other non-democratic centres
of power.
The hypothesis about the correlation between
the lack of public funding and state capture is
not fully supported by the data, however. Coun-
tries with significant public funding, such as
Slovakia and Croatia, also have developed forms
of state capture. The capturing of the state in
these cases seems to have been a product of op-
pressive majorities around Meciar and Tudjman,
who had managed to frustrate the opposition and
occupy the key economic positions in the coun-
tries. Having this in mind, it is obvious that pub-
lic funding cannot be seen as a remedy against
state capture on its own. But it could be argued
that the existence of significant state funding
will reduce the likelihood of state-capture, by
increasing the autonomy of democratically
elected politicians vis-à-vis business interests.
Of course, it could be argued that public fund-
ing has disadvantages of its own and that it is
an unsatisfactory solution  even if it may be
seen as a necessary one  to the fundamental
problem of lack of popular participation in po-
litical life.
In certain cases, the choice of a model with-
out significant public funding has been dictated
by the desire of the governing parties or politi-
cians to preserve their competitive advantages.
The clearest example of such a development has
been the Russian evolution of party funding and
campaign finance. After the dissolution of par-
liament in 1993, President Yeltsin saw the es-
tablishment of the political parties as a major
threat to his rule: therefore, both the electoral
system and the rules on party funding were de-
signed to encourage individual candidates and
ad hoc electoral alliances (Smilov 1999b). The
established parties had no major institutional
advantages, since the President preferred a rela-
tively weak and fragmented Duma, which would
be easier to control. Until 2001, there was no
special law on the political parties. The new law
adopted under President Putin does change the
situation to an extent, but it is too early to judge
how it is going to be applied in practice.16  In
short, the lack of significant public funding and
other institutional advantages served the strate-
gic goal of starving the opposition of resources.
The pro-presidential parties themselves were not
that disadvantaged, because they, as a rule, en-
joyed the support of various oligarchs, eager to
gain access to presidential and governmental
favours.
A similar logic could be observed in the case
of Bulgaria  the ruling parties in the country
gradually scaled down public funding, because
they realised that by being in power they were
in a much more favourable position in terms of
fund raising than the opposition. Thus, a grow-
ing funding gap between the government and
the opposition has appeared, which could be
observed both in the case of the Socialist gov-
ernment of Jan Videnov and the right-wing gov-
ernment of Ivan Kostov (Smilov 1999b).
The abuse of governmental positions for party
building purposes is an understudied topic in
Eastern Europe. The abundance of evidence and
allegations of such abuses in Russian elections,
but also in other countries in the region, sug-
gest that the dynamics of party funding could
hardly be understood properly without a more
careful study of this problem. An encouraging
fact is that, despite the pro-governmental bias
leading to a growing gap in the funding of the
governmental and opposition parties, electoral
surprises do happen in Central Eastern Europe
on a regular basis. Instructive is the case of
Bulgaria, where the financial might of the So-
cialist Party in 1997, and the UDF in 2001 did
not save them from bitter electoral defeats.
Meciars party in Slovakia and Tudjmans sup-
porters in Croatia lost key elections despite their
long stays in power and their opportunity to
accumulate huge resources. In some extreme
cases, like the last parliamentary elections in
Poland and Romania, the ruling parties could
not enter the legislature at all. What is more,
new major parties do appear all around the re-
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gion, and in some extravagant cases they even
manage to win parliamentary elections  King
Simeon IIs movement in Bulgaria is an inter-
esting, although probably aberrant example.
This evidence speaks against attributing too
much influence to the mechanisms and abuses
of party funding rules on the political process
in the countries of Central Eastern Europe. These
countries are not so captured after all, and the
democratic process has not been entirely stifled
by the interests of a few oligarchs. More trou-
bling from that perspective, seem to be Russia
and Ukraine, where radical political changes
concerning the centre of power  the presiden-
tial institution  are much more problematic. But
this is of course due to the constitutional struc-
ture of these states. In any event, the impact of
political finance models and practices on this
issue would be extremely difficult to measure.
If the political finance model matters in a par-
ticular area, however, it is definitely the area of
perception of the legitimacy of the governmen-
tal structures. Let us consider the fact reported
by the World Bank state capture study that 42%
of the firms in Bulgaria report themselves as
directly affected by illegal political donations.
At the time the BEEPS study was done, which
is the basis of the World Bank report, there were
no contribution limits in Bulgaria and no re-
quirements for disclosure of the name and the
amount of the donations. In what sense, then,
were the donations illegal? A plausible hypoth-
esis is that most of the respondents had differ-
ent ideas about the illegality of the donations,
but they converged in their common overall
perception of the political system in the coun-
try as corrupt. Thus, despite the effort of the
World Bank experts to base their study on more
tangible, proxy measures of corruption, prob-
ably a significant part of the responses they got
reflected general perceptions of the corruption
of the system as a whole. This is all the more
probable, having in mind the poor public knowl-
edge of the technical intricacies of the rules and
principles of party funding and campaign fi-
nance.
This observation suggests a bold hypothesis:
the egalitarian expectations for a well-regulated
system of political finance reflecting just social
principles, which the majority of Eastern Euro-
pean party funding models create, lead the pub-
lic to be bitterly disappointed in cases of irregu-
larities and to quick conclusions that the sys-
tem is rotten as whole. Perception of wide-
spread corruption is possibly a combined prod-
uct both of facts and extremely high expecta-
tions. If these perceptions lead to an improve-
ment of democracy in Eastern Europe, they
should be welcome. However, in countries
where there is a danger that a fledging democ-
racy itself may be disregarded as a corrupt form
of government perceptions should be treated
seriously, as they can become self-fulfilling
prophesies.
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